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ABSTRACT 
 
This article is concerned with major current developments in moral psychology, deriving 
from the study of the neurobiological bases of our responses to moral dilemmas. I briefly 
illustrate the most important research programs and outline the burning issues in 
neuroethics, both empirical and conceptual. 
 
 
“The rules of justice may be compared to the 
rules of grammar; the rules of the other 
virtues, to the rules which critics lay down 
for the attainment of what is sublime and 
elegant in composition.”   
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The most part of the philosophical and scientific literature in what is called 
neuroethics revolves around dilemmas. The most famous ones are a family of 
thought experiments usually called “the trolley problem” (after a famous 
example created by philosopher Philippa Foot in 1967), which have at least 
two major versions.  
Imagine that you are faced with these two hard choices. In the first one - 
the trolley dilemma (Foot 1967; Thomson 1986) - a runaway trolley is directed 
towards five people, who will be killed if it continues on its present course. The 
only way to save them is to hit a switch and turn the trolley onto other tracks, 
where it will run over and kill one person instead of five. Would you hit the 
switch?  
The second dilemma - the footbridge dilemma (Thomson 1986) - is slightly 
different: as before the runaway trolley threatens to kill five people, but now 
you are next to a fat stranger on a footbridge above the tracks. The only way 
to save them is now to push the fat stranger off the footbridge: he will be killed 
as a result, but he will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Would you 
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push the man? 
You are likely to have already encountered these two dilemmas and your 
answer was probably “yes” in the former and “no” in the latter.  
If those were your answers, your intuitions are the same as those exhibited 
by most of the tested subjects1 (Petrinovich et al. 1993; Mikhail 2000; Greene 
et al. 2001).   
These dilemmas have been a puzzle for both moral philosophers, who have 
tried to explain why it is right to sacrifice one life in the trolley dilemma but 
not in the footbridge case, and for moral psychologists2, who have tried to 
account for this explanandum, namely the phenomenon of the aversion to 
pushing the fat stranger.  
Surely, the most famous and cited account for this phenomenon in moral 
psychology and neuroethics is that of Joshua Greene (Greene et al. 2001; 
Greene et al. 2004), who has suggested to call the trolley dilemma 
“impersonal” while the footbridge dilemma is called “personal”.  As it seems, 
the latter triggers a fast emotional response that restrains us from pushing the 
fat stranger. Specifically, a moral violation is personal if “it is likely to a) cause 
serious harm, b) to cause harm to a particular person, c) to do so in such a way 
that the harm does not result from the deflection of an existing threat onto a 
different party, while a moral violation is impersonal if it fails to meet these 
two criteria” (Greene et al. 2004, p. 389; see also Greene 2006).  
It is possible to simplify these criteria for personal harm in terms of “ME 
HURT YOU”. The HURT condition refers to the primitive kind of harmful 
violations while the YOU criterion demands that the victim be vivid as an 
individual. The ME condition captures a notion of “agency”, requiring that 
the action must move in a direct way from the agent’s will. The rationale for 
distinguishing between personal and impersonal kinds of harm is mainly 
evolutionary:  “personal violence has been around for a very long time, 
reaching far back into our primate lineage” (Greene 2008a, p. 43).  
This explanation, however, has been the target of both methodological and 
empirical criticisms. As for the first kind of  critiques, subjects were 
ambiguously asked whether actions were “appropriate” or “inappropriate”3 
                                                        
1 Mikhail (2000) discovered that 19 subjects out of 20 respondents judged the action in the 
footbridge case “impermissibile”, while 18  subjects out of 20 subjects judged the action in 
the switch case “permissible”. 
2 Although research in neuroethics has mainly focused on our answers to moral dilemmas, 
there are studies focusing on our responses to social norms violations (Berthoz et al. 2002), 
to morally offensive versus neutral sentences (Moll et al. 2002) and in distributional tasks 
(Hsu et al. 2008). This is worth noting, because the use of moral dilemmas has been the 
target of criticism (e.g. McGuire 2009; Kahane & Shackel forthcoming). 
3 “It’s unclear how subjects construed this request (according to their moral values, what 
society deems acceptable, or what’s legal), making it difficult to determine whether the 
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(Schaich Borg et al. 2006; Kahane & Shackel forthcoming). Concerning the 
empirical criticique, Greene himself admits that the personal/impersonal 
distinction is inadequate (Greene 2008b, p. 112) and that it is subject to 
counterexamples (Kamm 1996; Mikhail 2000; Nichols & Mallon 2006). For 
example, Mikhail (2000, p. 127) presented subjects with two different versions 
of the trolley dilemma. As before, the train is rushing toward five people and 
we can save them by throwing a switch, turning the train temporarily onto 
other tracks. Fortunately, there is a heavy object on the side track, which will 
slow the train down and give them time to escape. We are asked whether or 
not we consider permissible to throw the switch in these two different 
conditions. In the first case the heavy object is a man, while in the second 
condition the object is not a person, but there is nontheless a man standing on 
the side track in front of a heavy object with his back turned. Most of the 
subjects  judged the action in the first dilemma impermissible (91%) and the 
action in the second dilemma permissible (87%)4. These two cases create 
problems for Greene’s proposal because they cannot be explained by appealing 
to any version of the personal / impersonal distinction.  
The aversion to pushing the fat stranger, however, has been accounted for in 
various ways: it has been mentioned the fact that the action is intentional 
(Moore et al. 2008; Cushman et al. 2006; Schaich Borg et al. 2006), that it 
involves a direct intervention on the victim (Waldmann & Dietrich 2007), a 
physical contact (Cushman et al. 2006) or a combination of “personal force” 
and intentionality (Greene et al. 2009a).  
However, we can roughly try to separate two different questions5: 
  a) which elements do trigger our response? 
b) what is the nature of our response? 
In order to explain our explanandum properly, we shall focus on b) and 
explain the nature of our moral judgments according to the literature.  
In #2 I will introduce the main available proposals and in #3-5 I will outline 
                                                        
aforementioned study results really reflect the processes that underlie moral judgment” 
(Schaich Borg et al. 2006, p. 805). Although this kind of criticism is not commonplace in 
moral psychology, it represents a classical objection in the cognitive psychology of 
reasoning. In the last couple of decades cognitive psychologists have shown that in certain 
contexts people tend to reason in ways that violate standard rules in logic and probability 
theory. However, the interpretation of these empirical results is not straightforward matter: 
Gerd Gigerenzer and others have argued that in some cases some pragmatic factors can lead 
subjects to construe the request and interpret certain problems differently from the way 
experimenters intend. (See Gigerenzer 1996; Hertwig & Gigerenzer 1999). 
4 Mikhail (2000) 
5 I do not assume that this distinction could be neatly drawn. However, it seems to me a 
useful way of reflecting upon the issue and it is consistent with Greene’s claims that “[his] 
dual process theory could be completely right, even if the personal / impersonal distinction 
is completely wrong” (Greene et al. 2009b). See #2 for a brief sketch of dual process theories. 
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the burning emprical and conceptual issues in the neuroethical debate.  
 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
 
A first answer to question b) is offered by the “pure rationalist” framework, 
dominant for most of the XX century. According to this view, our moral 
judgments are the product of conscious reasoning. Recently, however, the 
rationalist account of moral judgments has been strongly criticized and 
emphasis has been placed on intuitive and automatic processes, rather than on 
deliberative and reflexive ones. In this regard, Kern et al. (2009) talk of a 
“bounded ethicality” mimicking Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, which 
refers to the presence of heuristics and automatic shortcuts in our decision 
making. As a matter of fact, such a strictly rationalistic account of action do 
not seem to be endorsed by the great philosophers of the past, who always left 
a place for emotions in moral judgment, although in the neuroethics literature 
it is common to ascribe such rationalistic pictures to deontologists like Kant or 
to intuitionists like Moore or Ross.  
Currently, the theoretical perspectives that seem most entitled to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of our moral judgments are the “sentimentalist” 
framework and the “Universal Moral Grammar” (UMG) project. Or we can 
say, using Hauser’s labels (2006), that the debate in neuroethics is about 
whether the “Humean” creature (HC) or the “Rawlsian” creature (RC) is the 
best description of our moral mind.  
Concerning HC, the main sentimentalist proposals claim that the “dual 
process theories” (DPT) are a suitable perspective on moral decision making6. 
The main idea of DPT is that two qualitatively distinct sets of processes are 
identifiable, some of which are fast, automatic and low effort, while others are 
slow, analytical, inhibitory and high effort7... Such models are typical of the 
psychology of reasoning and the first instance in decision making is 
attributable to Stanovich & West (2000; 2003), which talked about automatic 
and analytic processes labeled respectively System 1 (S1) and System 2 (S2).  
Despite this general endorsement, the different sentimentalist accounts 
diverge in the role attributed to deliberation and reasoning in moral cognition. 
The pure sentimentalism (PS) suggested by Jonathan Haidt (Haidt 2001; 
Haidt 2007; Haidt & Bjorklund 2008) maintains that the dual process 
                                                        
6 For a theoretical discussion on DPT see Evans & Frankish (2009). 
7 There are some differences in the properties attributed to such set of systems, since DPT is 
applied in many domains, such as theory of reasoning (see Evans 2007), theory of memory 
(see Reyna 2004), psychology of social cognition (see Chen e Chaiken 1999) and theory of 
judgment and decision making (see Kahneman & Frederick 2002; 2005). 
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framework provides a compelling account for moral cognition and that 
reasoning does not have a causal role, but rather it merely allows post hoc 
rationalizations. In brief, moral judgment is the product of quick and 
automatic intuitions depending on emotions8 and this approach is thus a kind 
of intuitionism. Intuitionism in moral philosophy maintains that there are 
moral truths and that people do not grasp them by virtue of reasoning 
processes, but thanks to a process more similar to perception. By extension, 
the intuitionist approach in moral psychology maintains that moral intuitions 
come first and directly cause moral judgments.  
The hybrid sentimentalist model (HS) proposed by Joshua Greene (Greene 
et al. 2001; Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2008c) shares with PS the thesis 
that emotions play a key role in our moral cognition, but acknowledges the 
causal role for reasoning as well, although only in the limited domain of 
consequentialist judgments. Indeed, Greene proposes that the terms 
“deontology” and “consequentialism” refer to psychological natural kinds: 
“here we are concerned with two kinds of moral judgment (deontological and 
consequentialistic) and two kinds of process (“cognitive” and emotional)” 
Greene (2008a, p. 41). 
At the edge of the sentimentalist framework there is a more moderate claim, 
made by Shaun Nichols (Nichols 2002; Nichols 2004; Nichols & Mallon 2006), 
according to which moral cognition depends on an affect-backed normative 
theory. The normative theory consists of a set of prescriptive rules that codify 
moral and immoral behavior. This account attributes an important influence 
to affect, but argues that other accounts that emphasize emotional reactions, 
namely PS and HS, neglect the role of norms in moral judgments. This 
account implicates three processes: cost-benefit analysis, checking to see 
whether an action violates a rule, and an emotional reaction. However, we 
cannot  directly compare this proposal with PS and HS, because Nichols is 
skeptical about the possibility of obtaining a general model and claims that it 
is probably unrealistic to expect a tidy processing account of how these factors 
interact to generate judgments of impermissibility (Nichols & Mallon 2006).  
A proposal that departs more radically from the sentimentalist frame is the 
Universal Moral Grammar (UMG) project (Dwyer 2009; Dwyer 2006; Harman 
1999; Harman 2008; Hauser 2007; Hauser 2006; Mikhail 2009; Mikhail 2007), 
which shares with PS and HS the departure from the pure rationalist 
framework and an emphasis on both intuitive processes and the incapacity to 
justify moral judgments (Dwyer 2009; Haidt et al. 2008). Contrary to those 
models, however, it maintains that emotion-based accounts are in need of an 
                                                        
8 It is worth noting that this use of the term “intuition” is not the same as that proper to 
the historical versions of intuitionism (see Price, Moore and Ross). In fact, they have always 
used this term to refer to a cognitive act rather than to an emotional act. 
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appraisal theory: merely noting that some perceived moral violations are 
associated with emotional responses misses, among other things, the important 
step of interpreting the stimulus of evaluation. According to UMG, emotions 
do not have a causal role, because they appear when the judgment has already 
been formulated and are instead linked to motivation. Thus, the UMG project 
presents some particular features that set it apart from the previously 
discussed perspectives. 
Mikhail (2000) manipulated the causal structure of trolley cases and found 
that judgments are sensitive to relatively nuanced distinctions (doing / 
allowing harm, treating people as means / ends, intentional harm / harm 
produced as a side effect of good intentions). These structures seem to be 
shared among people with different cultural and moral background. Therefore, 
these principles are potentially valid elements of a universal moral grammar 
analogous to that postulated by the Chomskyan project in linguistics 
(Chomsky 1981 for a classic treatment; Moro 2008).  As in the case of language 
development, the innate moral grammar, too, provides information that 
regards the fondamental principles shared by all moral systems and the moral 
faculty, too, operates unconsciously, quickly and automatically.  
Moreover, in order to account for the differences among the morals, UMG 
refers to the theoretical framework of Principles and Parameters (P&P), 
developed in linguistics in the 1980s to reconcile the universal grammar (UG) 
with the variations through strict restrictions in the number and kinds of 
possible linguistic variables. According to this model, the moral faculty is 
associated with a set of parameters that can be adjusted in different ways in 
different contexts, so that a large room for moral diversity is allowed together 
with the permanence of a common basic structure.  
Since PS, HS and UMG are the main proposals available in moral 
psychology and in the recent field of neuroethics, we can isolate three burning 
issues9: 
1) the role of deliberation in moral decision making. 
Since PS maintains that moral judgments are the product of our emotions, 
it also predicts that a) a “weakening” of cognitive processes does not affect our 
moral judgments and that b) individual differences in cognitive capacities are 
not associated with different patterns in moral judgments.  
2) the role of emotion in moral decision making. 
Since UMG maintains that moral judgments are the product of our innate 
moral grammar, UMG predicts also that a’) manipulation of emotions is 
insufficient to modify the patterns of moral judgments, b’) lesions in brain 
areas usually associated with emotions do not modify patterns of moral 
                                                        
9  It is worth noting that whereas 1) and 2) are empirical questions, 3) is a much more 
conceptual issue. 
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judgments. 
    3) the linguistic analogy. 
In order to establish whether the “Humean” or the “Rawlsian” creature 
represents the most accurate description of our moral mind, we should not 
only analyse how strong the evidence in favor of the sentimentalistic view is, 
but also discuss the depth and soundness of the linguistic analogy. 
 
 
3. A causal role for deliberation? 
 
In order to choose between PS and HS and to understand which processes 
contribute to moral decision making, a crucial question regards the role we 
should ascribe to deliberation.  
Recently, Renata Suter et al.10 pitted the predictions of these two accounts 
against each other, presenting subjects with some moral dilemmas where 
deontological reasoning and consequentialist reasoning would lead to opposing 
judgments. The main difference is supposed to be the influence of the available 
cognitive resources. Therefore, the decision process in moral dilemmas was 
manipulated in five conditions: intuitive judgments were compared to 
judgments in four conditions that provided more available resources. 
Deliberative reasoning was fixed at either three minutes, or for an unlimited 
time, disturbed by a distraction condition for three minutes or manipulated 
through explicit reason listing. The finding is that the proportion of 
consequentialist judgments did not differ between conditions. In short, 
whether participants answered intuitively or engaged in deliberation, the 
answer patterns did not change. Therefore, it seems, cognitive elaboration does 
not influence choice in the kind of situations presented. Thus, we should 
choose PS and reject HS.  
However, the results of this study are not uncontroversial. First of all, it is 
not clear whether they undermine Greene’s claims or not: HS maintains that 
deontological judgments are driven by fast and automatic emotional processes, 
but this does not mean that judgments are deontological because they are 
processed with fewer available resources.  
In addition to that, there is a great deal of evidence in favor of the causal 
role of deliberation in moral judgments. Greene et al. (2004) observed the 
activation of the brain areas linked to cognition when an acceptance response 
occurred in personal dilemmas, but not when there was a refusal. It has also 
been noted that a greater activation in these areas occurred in difficult moral 
dilemmas, finding a correlation between the activation of the cognitive areas 
                                                        
10 This study was presented during the SPUDM22 conference in Rovereto (Trento, 
September 2009): discof.unitn.it/spudm22/infoPaper.jsp 
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activation and the acceptance of utilitarian judgments. 
Moreover, a confirmation in behavioral data has been sought, specifically by 
studying reaction times (RT). The interesting finding is that acceptance in 
personal moral judgments seems to demand longer RT than does refusal 
(Greene et al. 2001): this weighs in favor of HS, because the finding suggests 
that the deliberative system sometimes overrides the intuitive emotional 
response, requiring greater RT.  
In addition, some interesting works have recently analysed both the effects 
of cognitive loads and the impact of our individual differences. Concerning the 
first kind of studies, since the deliberative system works slowly and relies on 
scarce processing resources, factors such as time pressure, mental depletion and 
cognitive load will tend to weaken the deliberative processing in decision 
making. In the moral domain Greene et al. (2008c) tried to weaken the 
deliberative system and to evaluate how cognitive load manipulation interferes 
with moral judgement. In brief, the cognitive load consists of a mental activity 
imposed on the cognitive resources11. It is usually manipulated through a dual 
task procedure in which subjects have to complete another task while 
performing the task of primary interest. Thus, the aim of this study was to 
find direct evidence regarding the causal effect of cognitive processes in moral 
judgments. They presented participants with high-conflict  personal dilemmas 
and subjects responded under cognitive load and in a control condition. Since 
HS maintains that utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive 
processes while deontological judgments are driven by automatic processes, 
cognitive load manipulation should selectively interfere with utilitarian 
judgments. The findings were consistent with this prediction, as cognitive load 
increased RT with utilitarian judgments (and not with deontological 
judgments), yelding the predicted interaction between load and judgment 
type. However, this study represents just a partial confirmation for HS, 
because the manipulation did not reduce the proportion of consequential / 
deontological moral judgments.  
The other interesting field of study regards individual differences in thinking 
styles. Although these differences have been specifically investigated in other 
domains of decision making (Stanovich & West 1998, Stanovich 1999; 
Stanovich & West 2000), only recently have they been analysed within the 
moral domain. Bartels notes that “researchers who investigate processes 
involved in moral judgment tend to neglect the variance attributable to 
individual differences” (Bartels [2008], p. 408). Some recent studies on 
                                                        
11 Cornelissen et al. (2007) showed that people under higher cognitive load offer more in the 
Dictator Game and Benjamin et al. (2006) discovered that subjects under cognitive load 
discount delayed monetary rewards at higher rates. 
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individual differences, however, partially fill this gap: utilitarian judgments 
are associated with greater need for cognition (Bartels 2008) and working 
memory capacity (Moore et al. 2008). Therefore, there seems to be a 
correlation between the deliberative attitude and the exhibition of utilitarian 
judgments.  
 
 
4. A causal role for emotions? 
 
Recently collected evidence in favor of the thesis that emotions play a causal 
role covers many fields: experimental psychology, neuroscience, 
neuropathology. Behavioral data show that highly susceptible participants, 
hypnotically induced to experience a brief pang of disgust when confronted 
with a neutral word, see moral transgressions as morally more wrong in 
vignettes containing the hypnotically targeted word (Wheatly & Haidt 2005). 
Moreover, participants who watch a humorous clip from Saturday Night Live, 
as opposed to a neutral control clip, report feeling a more positive mood and 
offer moral utilitarian responses to the footbridge dilemma but not to the 
trolley dilemma (Valdesolo & DeSteno 2006). In addition, participants 
responding to moral dilemmas at a dirty desk or when smelling a noxious odor 
make more severe moral judgments than controls (Schnall et al. 2008).  
Also of interest are studies of frontotemporal dementia (FTD), which results 
from the deterioration of prefrontal and anterior temporal cortex and 
generates blunted emotion, disregard for others and a willingness to engage in 
moral transgressions. FTD patients show a pronounced tendency to adopt the 
utilitarian alternative in personal dilemmas such as the footbridge case 
(Mendez et al. 2005). With these results in mind, Koenigs et al. (2007) 
examined the judgments of the VMPC patients12 for moral and non moral 
dilemmas. VMPC patients were indistinguishable from controls, except in high 
conflict dilemmas in which they were more likely to endorse the utilitarian 
outcome13. Greene et al. attribute a utilitarian aptitude to these patients 
(Greene 2007). However, an experiment proposed by Koenigs and Tranel 
(2007) renders this interpretation controversial: they analysed VMPC patients’ 
behavior in the Ultimatum Game, finding that this pathological population is 
more inclined to refuse inequitable offers. Such vindictive responses are 
plausibly described as guided by norms of retributive justice in response to 
                                                        
12 A damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) has appeared to rob 
individuals of their abilities in a strikingly selective way. By far, the most celebrated of such 
cases is that of Phineas Gage (Damasio 1994). 
13 In a similar vein, also Ciaramelli et al. (2007) claim to show that VMPFC patients are 
more likely to endorse “personal” moral violations than healthy controls. 
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fairness and both fairness and retributive justice are paradigmatic examples of 
deontological considerations.  
Further evidence comes from studies on psychopaths, because they show a 
lack of concern for others, lack the capacities for guilt, remorse and empathy 
and fail to distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, thus suggesting 
that emotions provide the developmental source of our moral concepts (Blair 
1995; Blair 1997; Blair 2007).  
Finally, beyond classical experiments and brain imaging data offered in 
support of the claim that emotional circuits are engaged in moral tasks, recent 
landmark studies in the field of neuroeconomics include demonstrations that 
people’s frequent departures from selfish rationality are highly correlated with 
activity in emotion related areas. More specifically, these studies show that 
morally charged economic behaviors involve brain areas related to emotion. 
For example, in the Ultimatum Game (UG), when the first player proposes a 
division that departs drastically from the fair 50%, the second player usually 
rejects it and the decision to reject is preceded by increased activity in the 
anterior insula, which is often implicated in emotional activities. Recently it 
has also been observed that the rejection of unfair offers occurs even if it 
increases iniquity (Yamagishi et al. 2009). The main aim of this work was to 
analyse whether social preferences (i. e. for restoring fairness and for punishing 
norm violators) or moral disgust are the reasons that restrain subjects from 
accepting unfair offers in the UG14.  
 A major proportion (30-40% compared to 60-70% in the standard UG) of 
the tested subjects rejected unfair offers even when rejection reduced only 
their own earnings to 0, while not affecting the earnings of the person which 
proposed the unfair split. In addition, even when the responders could not 
                                                        
14 They investigated the reject of unfair offers in a variant of the UG called the Impunity 
Game (IG). IG is analogous to UG: it is played between a proposer and a responder and the 
proposer offers a division of money that the responder can accept or reject. When the offer 
is accepted, the proposer and the responder receive the amount specified in the proposal. 
When the offer is rejected, the responder loses whatever money was allocated by the 
proposer. Although the responder earns nothing, the proposer keeps the money he 
designeted for himself. A rejection of the offer by the responder therefore increases rather 
than reduces inequality. Thus, a social preference for iniquity aversion cannot explain 
rejection behavior in IG. The rejection of offers in IG, however, could be explained as an 
effort to punish the proposer’s unfair behavior by conveying anger to the proposer. The 
possibility of symbolic punishment is eliminated in a version of IG that is private. In this 
version the only difference is that the proposer is not informed that the responder has the 
option to reject the proposal. Thus, the proposer would never know whether the responder 
rejects the offer or not. Because the responder knows the proposer does not know whether 
she accepted or rejected the offer, he is not able to convey the anger directly to the proposer 
by rejecting the offer as unfair. 
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communicate their anger to the proposer, the same rate of rejection was 
observed. Since the rejection of unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be 
explained by the social preference for iniquity aversion, the explanation based 
on anger and moral disgust seems more plausible. Stated simply, “this 
unexpected finding is consistent with the emotional commitment model” 
(Yamagishi et al. 2009, p. 11522). Moreover, the activity in the insula has been 
found to correlate directly with the degree of concern about equity (Hsu et al. 
2008). In addition, when people choose to make constly charitable donations, 
they show increased activity in emotion and reward areas (Moll et al. 2006; 
Harbaugh et al. 2007).  
These findings collectively seem to support PS and HS, questioning the 
validity of the UMG project. Indeed, the idea that moral competence has a 
grammatical structure would be hard to reconcile with the claim that emotions 
play a causal role in the generation of grammatical intuitions. In order to 
restore the validity of UMG and criticise PS and HS, Huebner et al. (2009) 
attempted to deny that the evidence collected is either exhaustive, or 
adequate. Therefore, they claim that the activity of the emotional circuits 
provides only correlational data, showing that emotions are associated with 
moral judgments. Such data (on their own) can never be used to infer 
causality.  
Moreover, the study by Koenigs et al. shows that VMPC patients were 
indistinguishable from controls except in high-conflict dilemmas, confirming 
Hauser’s reactions to these findings (Hauser et al. 2008b, p. 178).  
Nor behavioral data can establish what role emotions really play, because 
“these data fail to isolate the precise point at which emotion has a role in our moral 
psychology” (Huebner et al. 2009).  
Data obtained from psychopaths, supposedly demonstrating the 
diachronical necessity of emotions, are considered contoversial. As Blair has 
shown by using age-matched psychopathic and non psychopathic juvenile 
delinquents, even psychopathic juveniles draw the moral - conventional 
distinction. Thus, psychopathic juvenile delinquents apparently lose the 
capacity to distinguish moral from conventional violations over the course of 
development. Therefore, perhaps the deficiences in the moral psychology of 
the psychopath are not a developmental consequence of emotional deficiences, 
but rather of antisocial behavior, because a life filled with antisocial behavior 
can modify the moral psychology of an individual. In addition, a recent study 
proposed by Royzman et al. (2009) reviewed a number of arguments and 
findings within the developmental literature that, collectively, pose a serious 
challenge to the proposition that emotion plays a substantial contributory role 
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in the construction of the moral domain15.. In light of their endorsement of an 
“unsentimental ethics”, their claim that “[the] strategy is sympathetic with the 
recent work by the proponents of the moral grammar approach” is not surprising 
(Royzman et al. 2009, p. 173).  
 
 
5. The reality of the linguistic analogy 
 
Even if the evidence presented in favor of PS and HS does not appear 
compelling, in order to settle the debate between “Rawlsian” and “Humean” 
models (Hauser 2006), a different strategy is feasible: we can question the 
depth and plausibility of the linguistic analogy. More specifically, it has been 
claimed that UMG is a controversial hypothesis because of some significant 
differences between moral psychology and linguistics. In this regard, critics 
question whether the main concepts and arguments deployed by UMG fit the 
moral domain well (Dupoux & Jacob 2007; Prinz 2008; Sripada 2008).  
For example, Sripada (2008) claimed that we should not export the 
“argument from the poverty of stimulus” (POS) to the study of moral 
cognition. Stated briefly, the POS arguments claim that there is a problem in 
explaining how certain cognitive capacity is acquired, because there is a gap 
between two features of the learning situation: the complexity of the learning 
target and the resources available to the subject. The evidence of this gap is 
assumed as evidence in favor of the existence of some structures that fill it. 
Supporters of the UMG project maintain that the POS argument applied to 
the moral domain supports the UMG hypothesis, but it is worth noting that 
assuming evidence in favor of an innate nature as evidence in favor of a 
grammatical structure is  fallacious. To clarify the point, it is sufficient to 
remember that Rorty’s claim (2006) according to which morality is not 
grounded in our biology and the claim that moral cognitive mechanisms lack a 
grammatical structure are quite different. Indeed, many cognitive mechanisms 
(e.g. color perception) lack a grammatical structure and are nonetheless 
grounded in our biology.  
Beyond this general consideration, Sripada has argued that in the case of 
language learning it is not possible to teach the correct grammar rules, 
because, in order to understand them, you must own a grammar. But that is 
precisely what the child is trying to learn. Instead, in the case of moral 
                                                        
15 Kelly et al. (2007) provide grounds for skepticism regarding many conclusions drawn from 
earlier research using the moral conventional task. This task has been widely used to study 
the emergence of moral understanding in children and to explore the deficiences in moral 
understanding in clinical populations: however – claim the authors – it is not a good assay 
for the existence of a psychologically important distinction. 
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learning this is not so: not only are moral norms not so obscure and far from 
experience as hierarchical tree structures and recursive rules in moral 
grammars, but the child already owns a language and therefore can be 
explicitly taught about which are the correct norms. Therefore, learning moral 
norms differs from learning moral rules in at least two important respects: the 
learning target is much simpler, and the resources available to the child are 
much greater. So, even if the POS argument is compelling in the case of 
language, it cannot be usefully exported to the study of moral cognition.  
It has also been suggested that the concepts of the P&P program are not 
adequate in the moral domain. More specifically, there are two different 
questions which raise two different kinds of criticism: a) is P&P a suitable 
perspective on moral cognition? and b) which are the principle of our moral 
grammar?  
Prinz (2008) claims that we should answer “no” to question a). Thus, 
question b) becomes meaningless. The reason is that if we consider opposing 
moral systems such as liberalism and conservatism, we are not faced with 
different settings of the same basic rules, but rather with debates regarding the 
correct principles to follow. In short, the differences between the existent 
morals do not seem treatable as parametric variations, without trivializing the 
notion of parameter. 
Moreover, even if we concede that the P&P structure could represent an 
adequate framework, it remains to be confirmed the principles proposed by the 
UMG supporters are plausible. For example, Hauser (2006) claimed that 
“equity” is a universal principle, whose parameters are fixed by local cultures. 
Nevertheless, the data proposed in favor of the universality and stability of 
equity between different populations are not uncontroversial. Henrich et al. 
(2005) investigated subjects’ responses in the Ultimatum Game, the Dictator 
Game and the Public Goods Game in small scale populations in different 
cultures, focusing on their compatibility with the selfishness axiom of the 
economic theory. Although there is no society in which experimental behavior 
is fully coherent with this  axiom, variation observed between groups was 
much greater than that previously reported. Thus, the universality of equity 
norms is not uncontroversial and it rests on an open empirical question.  
However, the proponents of the moral grammar approach have never 
claimed that they are already able to answer question b) properly: for 
example, Harman (2008, p. 350) has recently argued that the discovery of the 
principles of our moral grammar is surely not straightforward matter16. 
                                                        
16 “The main difficulty in pursuing an analogy between linguistics and moral psychology is 
to come up with relevant moral principles beyond the most superficial ones. What are the 
principles that help to determine the out come when the superficial principles conflict? Such 
principles, if there are any, might comprise a moral grammar” (Harman 2008, p. 350). 
Recent Trends in Neuroethics: A Selected Bibliography 
 81
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
To return to the question with which I started: What is the nature of our 
moral judgment? Nobody denies that a growing body of findings demonstrates 
that moral judgments are linked to emotions. Nontheless, we are far from 
stating whether emotions are the cause or the mere consequence of moral 
judgments and whether deliberation plays a crucial role in moral cognition or 
not. Moreover, it is not clear how much insight the research programme 
developed by linguists can provide into morality. Thus, the debate could not 
be solved so far. 
However, a few remarks are still in order. We should not be skeptical about 
the possibility of arriving at an answer. Indeed, we are allowed to expect that 
more accurate answers could be soon given by using new experimental 
techniques and more methodological rigour.  
The import of different experimental approaches from psychology and 
neuroscience maybe represents the best recipe for an experimental moral 
science17. For example, the use of of cognitive loads18 and TMS19 and the study 
of individual differences20 could enlighten the analysis of the nature of moral 
judgments.  
A plea for more rigour could serve our goal as well. Greater consistency in 
the scales used to measure the role of emotion in moral psychology is urged by 
Hubner et al. (2009)21, while a different concern has been stressed by Kahane & 
Shackel (forthcoming): the battery of dilemmas used in neuroethics often 
includes several dilemmas which are not even in the relevant domain and thus 
                                                        
17 See Greene et al. (2008c) for the use of cognitive loads in moral psychology. See Bartels 
(2008) and Moore et al. (2008) for the study of individual differences. 
18 See Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999); Ward & Mamm (2000); Skitka et al. (2002); Benjamin et al. 
(2006); Cornelissen et al. (2007) 
19 TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) delivers short magnetic pulses that penetrate 
the skull and disrupt neural processing in a noninvasive, reversibile way. See Van’t Wout et 
al. (2005) for the use of this technique in neuroeconomics. Greene claims that “other 
manipulations (e.g. transcranial magnetic stimulation applied to dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex) may be more successful in altering judgment” and that he “leave[s] this for future 
research” (Greene 2008c, p 1152).   
20 Stanovich (1999); Stanovich & West (1998; 2000) 
21 “There is little consistency in the scales used to measure the role of emotion in moral 
psychology: some use a 7- point scale ranging from perfectly OK to extremely immoral, 
others use a scale asking “how morally wrong” an action is. Yet, others pose a dichotomous 
question about “acceptability” or “permissibility” and some use a combination of these and 
other scales within the same study. This makes the comparison across, and even within, 
impossible”(Huebner et al. 2009, p. 3). 
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it is improbable that they could capture any natural distinction in moral 
psychology22. However, the involvement of moral philosophers in developing 
stimuli could obviously serve our purpose (Schaich Borg et al. 2006): it is 
possible to increase rigour by letting moral philosophers independently classify 
scenarios directly in terms of their content.  
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